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ABSTRACT
NASA conducted a series of flight experiments at Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport as part
of the Low Visibility Landing And Surface Operations (LVLASO) program. LVLASO is one of
the sub-elements of the NASA Terminal Area Productivity (TAP) program, which is focused on
providing technology and operating procedures for achieving clear-weather airport capacity in
instrument-weather conditions, while also improving safety. LVLASO is investigating various
technologies to be applied to airport surface operations, including advanced flight deck displays
and surveillance systems. The purpose of this report is to document the performance of the
surveillance systems tested as part of the LVLASO flight experiment. There were three
surveillance sensors tested: primary radar using Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE-3)
and the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS), Multilateration using the Airport
Surface Target Identification System (ATIDS), and Automatic Dependent Surveillance -
BrOadcast (ADS-B) operating at 1090 MHz. The performance was compared to the draft
requirements of the ICAO Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
SMGCS). Performance parameters evaluated included coverage, position accuracy and update
rate. Each of the sensors was evaluated as a standalone surveillance system.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
NASA completed a series of flight experiments at Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport as part
of the Low Visibility Landing and Surface Operations (LVLASO) program. LVLASO is one of
the sub-elements of the NASA Terminal Area Productivity (TAP) program, which is focused on
providing technology and operating procedures for achieving clear-weather capacity in
instrument-weather conditions at airports while also improving safety [ 1]. LVLASO is
investigating technology to be applied to airport surface operations including landing, roll-out,
turnoff, inbound taxi, outbound taxi, and takeoff. Technologies under investigation are advanced
flight deck displays and surveillance systems.
The flight deck displays that were tested provided the flight crew with enhanced guidance and
situational awareness information through the use of a head-up display (HUD) and a head-down
electronic airport map liquid-crystal display (LCD). These displays were integrated with onboard
sensors and datalinks as well as ground subsystems that provided relevant surface data. These
displays are designed to function in one of two modes: (l) during high-speed roll-out and runway
exit, the Roll-Out Turn-Off (ROTO) display symbologies were engaged; and (2) during taxi, the
Taxi Navigation and Situational Awareness (T-NASA) displays were engaged.
There were three types of surveillance sensors tested: primary radar using ASDE-3/AMASS,
Multilateration using ATIDS, and ADS-B. The purpose of this report is to document the
performance of the surveillance systems tested as part of the LVLASO flight experiment. The
performance is compared to the draft requirements of the ICAO Advanced Surface Movement
Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS). Each of the sensors was evaluated as a standalone
surveillance system.
2.0 SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
2.1 Surveillance System Architecture
The LVLASO ground architecture, illustrated in Figure 1, includes the following elements:
1. Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE-3) radar - Provides surveillance (position
only) of aircraft or vehicles operating on the runway/taxiway area
2. Airport Surface Target Identification System (ATIDS) - Provides surveillance (position
and ID) of aircraft and ground vehicles equipped with 1090 MHz ADS-B, Mode-S
transponders, and Mode A/C transponders
3. Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) - Provides the following:
a) Tracking of ASDE-3 targets
b) Data fusion of ATIDS target data with ASDE-3 track data to enhance situational
awareness for Air Traffic Control (ATC) and flight crews with Cockpit Display of
Traffic Information (CDTI)
c) Safety logic to detect runway incursions and other conflicts
4. Differential GlobalPositioningSystems(DGPS)groundstation-Providesdifferential
correctionsfor navigationandsurveillance
5. Digital datalink system- Providesthefollowing:
a)Digital transmissionof CDTI datato T-NASA equippedaircraft
b) Differential correctionstransmissionto GPSequippedaircraft
c) Digital transmissionof ATC instructionsand flight crew acknowledgments
6. ARTS - Provides ASR-9 radar position/ID of airborne aircraft near the airport.
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Figure I. LVLASO Surveillance System Architecture
The LVLASO architecture contains three surveillance sensors, ADS-B, ASDE-3, and ATIDS.
The flow of surveillance data is shown in Figure 1. The ASDE-3 provides primary radar
information to the AMASS system. The AMASS digitizes and tracks the radar returns. ATIDS
sends aircraft position information derived either from multilateration or from ADS-B position
reports with aircraft tail number to AMASS. ARTS supplies the flight information, such as
aircraft type and flight information, by matching the aircraft 3A identity code. The surveillance
data from all three sensors is fused by AMASS. This traffic information is displayed for ATC (at
thecontrollerinterface)andbroadcastbyVHF datalink to theNASA 757 for displayon the
cockpitCDTI.
2.2 Multilateration
Multilateration and target identification was accomplished with an ATIDS system developed by
Cardion, Inc. called Cooperative Area Precision Tracking System (CAPTS). ATIDS is based on
SSR technology and is an enhancement to current airport primary surveillance equipment, which
at ATL is ASDE-3/AMASS. ATIDS augments the ASDE-3/AMASS surveillance with aircraft
identification and surveillance to fill in coverage gaps of the ASDE-3 radar. ATIDS is a
multilateration system that receives SSR transmissions from aircraft and triangulates, or
multilaterates, from several receiver locations to pinpoint the location of an SSR transponder.
The system is designed to operate with aircraft equipped with Mode A/C and Mode S avionics.
The ATIDS architecture consists of ATIDS remote receiver/transmitters (RTs), modems and an
ATIDS master work station (MWS). Mode S short squitter and Mode A/C multilateration are used
to locate and identify aircraft. The Mode S short squitter multilateration element uses ATIDS
remote stations to time stamp and decode Mode S aircraft identification. These squitters are
pseudo-randomly transmitted by aircraft transponders nominally once per second. The time
stamped and decoded squitters are transmitted via radio modems to the ATIDS server for position
processing. Using multilateration, aircraft position is determined each time squitters are received
from three or more RTs. As installed at Atlanta, the ATIDS system uses 5 RTs, shown in Figure 2.
The system is configured to provide coverage only on the north side of the airport.
Mode A/C multilateration works on the same principle as Mode S multilateration with the
exception that it requires the Mode A/C transponder to be interrogated to elicit a reply. The
transponder responds to ATIDS remote station "whisper-shout" interrogations which permits a
separation of responses in time for equi-range transponders. The transponder reply contains the
beacon 4096 code information for identification of the aircraft.
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Figure 2. Configuration of ATIDS RTs
2.3 Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)
ADS-B is a function on an aircraft that periodically broadcasts the aircraft state vector (position
and velocity) [4]. Air traffic control can receive the state vector reports to accurately display
traffic identity and position. Other aircraft can receive the information for use in collision
avoidance and CDTI applications.
ADS-B, as implemented in the Atlanta tests, consisted of a Collins GPS receiver and Mode S
extended squitter transponder. Differential corrections were broadcast from a local area
differential system and received by the NASA 757. Aircraft position was calculated once per
second and the most recently computed position was transmitted nominally twice per second.
Two different ADS-B messages were transmitted, depending on whether the aircraft was
airborne or on the airport surface. The airborne ADS-B message includes type code (information
on airborne or surface message and precision category of the data), surveillance status, turn
indicator (turning or not turning), altitude (either barometric or GNSS derived), and encoded
latitude and longitude (17 bits). The surface ADS-B message includes type code (same as
airborne), ground speed, track angle and encoded latitude and longitude. ADS-B transmissions
alternate between the top and bottom mount antennas when airborne. ADS-B transmissions are
only radiated from the top mount antenna when the aircraft is on the ground.
2.4 ASDE-3/AMASS
The ASDE-3 is a Ku band primary radar used for airport movement area surveillance. It is
intended to provide controllers with enhanced visibility of airport surface traffic in low visibility
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conditions,therebyincreasingsafetyandreducingrunwayincursions. It usesanantennarotating
oncepersecond,resultingin atargetupdateatthesamerate. TheASDE-3providessurveillance
of aircraftandvehiclesoperatingon runwaysandtaxiwaysthatarein direct line of site to the
radar. Non-movementareassuchasgrassandrampareasareintentionallyfiltered out. The
ASDE-3 installedat ATL is aproductionunit installedon topof theair traffic control tower.
TheAirport MovementAreaSafetySystem(AMASS)is aprototypeadd-onto theASDE-3 radar
designedto improvetheability of theradarto detectandpreventrunwayincursions.AMASS
takesradarreturninputsfrom theASDE-3anddigitizesit anddeterminesthecentroidandextent
informationof airportsurfacetargets.Usingthisdigitizeddata,theAMASS cantrack aircraft
andvehicleson theairportsurfaceandprovideautomaticcautionsor warningsof conflicts and
runwayincursions.
2.5 Fusion of Surveillance Data
In addition to ASDE-3, AMASS can accept inputs from other surveillance sensors and fuse the
data to provide controllers with one surveillance picture. At ATL, AMASS fused data from the
following sources:
• ARTS arrival database information
• ASDE-3/AMASS target track information
• ATIDS 1090 MHz ADS-B target information, and
• ATIDS 1090 MHz multilateration target information
The resulting fused surveillance data was output to a controller interface and to a datalink
manager to be transmitted to the NASA 757. No analyis was conducted for this report on the
performance of the surveillance fusion process.
3.0 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Test Conditions
A complete description of the tests can be found in the NASA test plan [2]. Following is a brief
description of the operations, with emphasis on the test conditions relative to surveillance.
3.1.1 NASA 757 Tests
The LVLASO flight test operations began in the ramp area just north of runway 8L/26R at ATL
at the fixed-base operator (FBO), Mercury Air Center. At the beginning of each test, the
responsible flight deck crewmember called for taxi instructions from ATL ATC. On receipt of
the instruction, the captain taxied the test aircraft to the designated runway. The test aircraft
either conducted a cycle (takeoff/circle/land) or taxied down the runway, depending on the
experiment. Finally, after roll-out and turn-off from the runway, the test aircraft taxied back to
the FBO ramp area thus emulating a "gate-to-gate" operation. A typical takeoff/circle/land test is
shown in Figure 3, which shows the ADS-B position reports plotted on the north movement area.
In this case,theNASA 757taxiedfrom theFBO (northcenterof figure), taxiedvia Alpha,Dixie,
andEchoto runway26L. It took off from runway26L,circledthearoundtheairport,landedon
runway26R,exitedonB5, andtaxiedbackto theFBO viaBravo,Charley,andAlpha. See
AppendixF for adiagramof theairportrunwaysandtaxiways.
Therunswererepeatedwith thefollowing variables,aslistedin Table 1:
• Nearpeakor non-peak traffic conditions
• Time of Day (TOD): Day (D) or Night (N)
• HUD: Yes (Y) or No (N)
• Map LCD: Yes (Y) or No (N)
• Pilot, co-pilot assignments
• Land: Takeoff (Y) or Taxi only (N) run
• Exit: Name of exit taken off runway
• Operation: North (N) or South (S) side operation
Tests were performed both during the day and at night. A majority of the tests were performed at
night to approximate low visibility conditions. Aircraft state data and datalink data were
electronically recorded for post-processing. Surveillance system output files were recorded for
each test.
3.1.2 Vehicle to Vehicle Tests
ADS-B coverage tests were conducted for vehicle to vehicle surveillance, whereby the 1090
MHz ADS-B reception performance of a vehicle on the surface was evaluated. This application
is a potential extension of the airborne application using direct aircraft to aircraft ADS-B
transmissions to obtain traffic information. The alternative approach, which was also tested, is
for vehicle to obtain traffic information from a TIS (Traffic Information Service) data link. In
either implementation, the goal is to improve pilot situational awareness by a visual display of
traffic information in the cockpit.
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To test the feasibility of this function on the airport surface, several vehicle to vehicle scenarios
were tested. A van was equipped with an ADS-B receiver and antenna mast with an adjustable
height (2.5 - 15 meters). An ATIDS RT provided the ADS-B reception/decoding. An aircraft
transponder antenna and a ground plane were used in conjunction with the ADS-B receiver. The
van was used to simulate a GA or small commuter aircraft with a low antenna height (2.5 meters)
and an air carrier aircraft by raising the antenna to 6 meters. The van and the NASA 757 could
then experiment with various scenarios where one aircraft would be required to receive the ADS-
B transmissions of the other.
The fh'st scenario involves an aircraft at a runway/taxiway intersection waiting to cross while an
aircraft is on final approach to that runway. The second scenario is similar, involving an aircraft
holding short of a runway while another aircraft takes off on that runway. The holding aircraft
must be able to see the aircraft on the active runway on the cockpit display. To test these
scenarios, the van was parked while the NASA 757 landed or departed on one of the north side
runways. The ADS-B reports transmitted by the 757 were recorded at the van and later analyzed
for coverage gaps.
The third scenario involves one aircraft following another. For taxi operations in low visibility, a
following aircraft must be able to receive the ADS-B position reports of the aircraft in front of it.
To test this, the van followed the NASA 757 while it taxied on the movement area. The ADS-B
reports transmitted by the 757 were recorded at the van and later analyzed for coverage gaps.
3.1.3 Van Tests
To further analyze the coverage of the surveillance systems, a van equipped with a 1090 MHz
ADS-B pallet was driven on the airport surface. The van was driven in the ramp areas to
determine the performance of ADS-B in blocked and high multipath regions. The van was
driven through the entire length of each ramp area. The van was also driven on the taxiways at a
constant velocity to obtain more coverage data. For all van tests, the surveillance output files
were recorded for later analysis.
3.2 Data Collection
3.2.1 NASA 757 and Van Tests
Multilateration and 1090 MHz ADS-B data were logged at the ATIDS Master Work Station for
the B-757 runs. The runs included departures, arrivals, north side movement area taxiing and
south side movement area taxiing. The surveillance performance assessment was performed for
the region where ATIDS was optimized to provide coverage. Extracts from the log files of
several runs were used to create a master file for the north side movement area. The master file
includes unprocessed 1090 MHz message data and position processed data. Multilateration
coverage, ADS-B coverage, and ADS-B update rate were evaluated using the B-757 master file.
$
Table 1. Experiment Variable Matrix (NASA 757)
# Date Start Stop TOD HUD LCD Captain Land Exit Oper
T1 8/20 00:08 00:50 D Y Y HVASTA Y B3 (26R) N
T2 8121 02:36 03:09 N Y Y PENNY Y B3 (26R) N
T3 8/22 00:18 00:48 D Y Y PRAH Y B3 (26R) N
T4 8/23 00:06 00:39 D Y Y SMITH Y B3 (26R) N
4 8/20 02:37 02:58 N N N HVASTA N M4 (27R) S
5 8/20 03:53 04:17 N N Y HVASTA N P (27L) S
6 8/20 01:04 01:20 N Y Y HVASTA N E3 (26L) N
7 8/20 03:12 03:42 N Y Y HVASTA Y B5 (26R) N
8 8/20 04:28 04:52 N Y Y HVASTA Y B5 (26R) N
9 8/21 00:36 01:11 N Y Y HVASTA Y A4 (26R) N
13 8/21 01:28 02:23 N N N PENNY N N4 (27L) S
14 8/21 03:26 03:50 N N Y PENNY N N4 (27L) S
15 8/21 04:43 04:59 N Y Y PENNY N E3 (26L) N
16 8/21 04:03 04:32 N Y Y PENNY Y B5 (26R) N
17 8/22 03:18 03:47 N Y Y PENNY Y B3 (26R) N
18 8/22 03:58 04:20 N Y Y PENNY Y A4 (26R) N
22 8/22 02:39 03:01 N N N PRAH N T (27R) S
23 8/22 04:28 04:52 N N Y PRAH N P (27R) S
24 8/22 01:08 01:33 N Y Y PRAH N E3 (26L) N
25 8/23 02:34 03:00 N Y Y PRAH Y B5 (26R) N
26 8/23 03:08 03:36 N Y Y PRAH Y B5 (26R) N
27 8/23 03:45 04:06 N Y Y PRAH Y A4 (26R) N
31 8/24 02:19 02:34 N N N SMITH N M18 (9L) S
32 8123 04:14 04:32 N N Y SMITH N T (27R) S
33 8/23 00:47 01:01 N Y Y SMITH N E3 (26L) N
34 8/24 00:47 01:09 N Y Y SMITH Y Bll (8L) N
35 8/24 02:42 03:10 N Y Y SMITH Y B 11 (SL) N
36 8/23 23:13 23:39 N Y Y SMITH Y A6 (8L) N
38 8/7 19:31 20:00 D N Y VERST N E11 (SR) N
40n 8/7 00:16 00:37 N N Y VERST N Bll (SL) N
40s 8/7 00:48 01:20 N N Y VERST N M (9L) S
41 8/7 03:00 03" 13 N Y Y VERST N B7 (8L) N
42 8/7 03:31 04:00 N Y N VERST Y B11 (8L) N
43 8/7 04:45 05:09 N Y N VERST Y B7 (8L) N
44 8/7 04:10 04:35 N Y N VERST Y A6 (8L) N
45 8/2 21:00 21:25 D Y Y VERST Y Bll (8L) N
46 8/7 18:45 19:21 D Y Y VERST Y B11 (8L) N
49 8/5 23:12 23:29 D N Y BROWN N E3 (26L) N
Sl 8/5 01:01 01:18 N N Y BROWN Y B3 (26R) N
52 8/7 02:35 02:49 N Y Y BROWN N E11 (8R) N
53 8/5 02:59 03:24 N Y N BROWN Y B5 (26R) N
54 8/5 03:42 04:05 N Y N BROWN Y B3 (26R) N
55 8/5 04:15 04:34 N Y N BROWN Y A4 (26R) N
56 8/5 22:27 23:00 D Y Y BROWN Y B3 (26R) N
57 8/7 17:11 17:4.0 D Y Y BROWN Y NI0 (9R) S
58 8/6 00:34 01:09 N Y Y BROWN Y B 1 (26R) N
D1 8/25 19:19 19:45 D Y Y VERST Y B3 (26R) N
D2 8/26 15:22 15:45 D Y Y VERST Y B3 (26R) N
D3 8/26 19:26 19:56 D Y Y VERST Y B3 (26R) N
D4 8/27 15:23 15:47 D Y Y VERST Y B3 (26R) N
D5 8127 18:46 19:24 D Y Y VERST Y B3 (26R) N
D6 8/28 15:39 16:02 D Y Y VERST Y B3 (26R) N
D7 8/28 19:07 19:33 D Y Y VERST Y B3 (26R) N
The master file represents a single pass on each of the runways and taxiways on the north side
movement area. The data collection was performed during low traffic periods, thus degradations
in multilateration and ADS-B surveillance performance due to garbling were minimized. A
similar master f're was created for the ASDE-3/AMASS using the same run numbers and time
periods that were used in creating the ADS-B/multilateration master file.
While ATIDS is capable of Mode A/C multilateration, the scope of the ATL trials did not
include an evaluation of Mode A/C multilateration. The Mode A/C performance needs to be
evaluated if the system is to provide standalone (e.g., operations without a primary sensor like
radar) surveillance.
3.2.2 Vehicle to Vehicle Tests
For the scenarios described in Section 3.1.2, the 1090 MHz ADS-B data from the NASA 757
was recorded by the receiver in the van. Several arrivals, departures, and follow tests were
performed. These output files were later plotted and evaluated qualitatively for coverage
performance.
4.0 TEST ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.1 Multilateration Surveillance Evaluation
4.1.1 Coverage
4.1.1.1 Data Collection
The B-757 master file (See 3.2.1) was used in the evaluation of multilateration coverage.
4.1.1.2 Analysis Method
ATIDS multilaterates on both the 1090 MHz ADS-B transmissions and the short squitter
transmissions emitted by the B-757s Mode S transponder. The ADS-B transmissions from the
master file were used to evaluate horizontal and vertical coverage performance for the following
reasons:
Multilaterated ADS-B transmissions provide a higher number of data samples than the
multilaterated short squitters due to the higher transmission rate (e.g., twice a second as
opposed to once a second).
• ADS-B decoded positions provides the location of the B-757 for each RT reception whether
or not a multilateration position solution was determined.
While ADS-B transmissions are more susceptible to bit errors due to message length ( 112 bits)
than the short squitter (56 bits), there is no degradation in multilateration performance over the
short squitter. Only the message type (first five bits) and the 24 bit address field of both message
types are used in the multilateration processing. Errors in the remaining bits do not affect
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multilaterationprocessing.Thustheprobabilitiesof receiving/decodinga multilaterationuseable
ADS-B transmissionandmultilaterationuseableshortsquitteraresimilar.
4.1.1.3 Results
Figure 4 provides a plot of multilateration position updates for the master file. The density of the
position reports is influenced by velocity and multilateration position update performance.
Updates on the taxiways tend to be more dense than the runways due to differences in taxi
velocities (e.g., slower taxi velocities result in shorter distances between updates). Missed
position updates result from any of the following causes: surveillance system failures (i.e., loss
of synchronization); surveillance system inefficiencies (i.e., timing errors, non-optimized
correlation/tracker); random Mode S message garbling; and multipath.
The north side of the airport was divided into 6 regions as illustrated in Figure 5. Potential
coverage gaps were identified with missing consecutive updates exceeding 2 seconds. Loss of
coverage in Region 1 was positively identified as the result of a system failure. Surveillance was
provided in Region 1 for other runs as illustrated in the Run 49 coverage plot, Figure B-1.
Region 3 is known to be a problem area due to multipath off the Delta hangars [4]. Typically,
only two RTs receive 1090 MHz transmissions that are useable for multilateration in this region.
Adding an additional RT on the east end of the Delta hanger could solve the problem of lost
updates. This had not be done because full coverage in this region is not critical to ATIDS role
in ATL as a secondary sensor to the ASDE-3/AMASS.
The cause of Region 3 missed updates on the runway was investigated. It was determined that
the RT receptions to perform multilateration were available, however system processing resulted
in dropped updates. Based on studying data not included in the master file, it was determined
that the updates were frequently being dropped during periods of high acceleration and
deceleration. Multipath was eliminated as the cause by evaluating regions that were not affected
by multipath as was the taxiway in Region 3. The problem is illustrated in Figure B-2, which
shows positions being dropped during periods of high acceleration and deceleration for a
departure and the subsequent arrival. The problem was more prevalent with NASA B-757 than
for commercial aircraft, potentially due to the difference in the periodicity of the Mode S
transmissions between the B-757 and commercial aircraft. Commercial aircraft have a nominal
short squitter transmission rate of 1 per second. The B-757 transmitted both short and long
squitter. At times the long squitter transmissions, which are used for both ADS-B and
multilateration, occurred within. 1 seconds of the short squitter transmissions. When this
happened during rapid acceleration or deceleration, the logged data showed that CAPTS failed to
generate updates.
It is critical that an aircraft taxiing on the movement area not disappear from ATC surveillance.
Data shows that loss of surveillance can potentially occur as an aircraft stops in certain regions.
Figure B-3 provides a plot made from a composite of several overlying runs. The plot shows that
there are no regions where position reports do not get generated. However, reduced update rate
performance is experienced in regions of poor coverage, such as Region 3 (B- 1).
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Figure 5. ATL North Movement Area Divided into Six Regions
Table 2 provides a summary of the system performance. An important factor to be considered is
that ATIDS is an R&D prototype, thus not a fully mature product. As discussed above, some
updates were lost due to a system failure. The test data also indicates that additional updates can
potentially be recovered. Transmission reception of error free or low error rate (less than 25% of
the address bits corrupt) from three or more RTs is required to determine a position. In 61
percent of the no solution cases, three or more RTs received useable multilateration
transmissions. The test data suggests that deficiencies in system processing may be playing a
significant role in the missed updates, particularly for Regions 1 and 3. Of the updates that have
potential for recovery, 53 percent were received by 4 to 5 RTs.
Table 2. Coverage Performance Summary with Coverage Gaps
1090 MHz Message Category
Position solution obtained
No solution - Region 1 missed updates due to system 4.0
failure of unknown cause
4.1No solution - Region 3 missed updates due to system
failure to properly correlate position updates
No solution - potentially recoverable missed updates
with 3 or more RTs receiving (excluding Regions 1 and
3)
Percent out of total transmitted 1090 MHz
messages
78.8
No solution - Not recoverable updates w/2 or less RTs 5.1
receiving (all regions)
Total I00
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In caseswhere only 2 RTs successfully decoded multilateration useable messages multipath was
the key factor. Reducing the impact of multipath on any given RT is a difficult technical
challenge. Achieving optimum coverage requires RT diversity.
The problem of uncorrelated updates could be re-analyzed by reprocessing the data with changed
tracker parameters, but time constraints limited exploring this analysis. Instead, coverage
performance was reassessed using replacements to Regions 1 and 3 with surveillance data
recorded from other runs that experienced lower acceleration/deceleration. The replacements to
the regions still exhibited missed updates with 3 or more RTs receiving, but not to the degree of
the master file runs. Figure B-4 provides a plot of the corrected master file. Table 3 provides a
summary of the performance. While the system performance for position solutions did improve,
there is room for more improvement. There is a high probability of recovering a position
solution for receptions of 4 or more RTs. Some of the 3 RT reception cases may be recoverable.
Table 3. Coverage Performance Summary with Coverage Gaps Corrected
1090 MHz Message Category
Position solution obtained
No solution - potentially recoverable missed updates
with 4 or more RTs receiving
No solution - potentially recoverable missed updates
with 3 RTs receiving
No solution - potentially not recoverable updates w/2 or
less RTs receiving
Total
Percent out of total transmitted 1090 MHz
messages
82.3
7.4
5.4
4.9
100
Reception performance by RT and by region (defined in Figure 5), for the master file, is provided
in Table 4. Plots showing B-757 Mode S transmission reception by RT are provided in Figures
B-5 through B-9. RTs 0 and 1 exhibited fairly consistent reception throughout the coverage area.
RT 2 experienced poor performance in Region 3 due to multipath associated with the Delta
hangers. RT 4 also experienced loss of updates in front of the Delta hangers. RT 4 does not
have line of sight with this region. Poor surveillance in Region 3 was a significant factor in
overall coverage performance. Position solution performance increased from 82.3% to 87.7%
when Region 3 was excluded from the coverage assessment.
Several commercial traffic departures were examined to determine altitude coverage. Traffic
was consistently monitored from the surface up to a minimum of 500 feet Above Ground Level
(AGL). On average, coverage was provided up to 1000 feet AGL.
4.1.2 Accuracy
4.1.2.1 Data Collection
The B-757s multilaterated Mode S transmissions were logged by ATIDS during a taxi only run
(no departures/arrivals). During the same run, Ashtech differentially corrected GPS data were
logged in the B-757. The Ashtech data provided a truth source for the multilaterated position
data.
14
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Table 4.
RT0
Reception
Mode S Message Reception by RT
RT1
Reception
RT2
Reception
RT3
Reception
RT4
Reception
Recorded
Position
Solutions
1 76.4 95.4 92.9 92.9 92.1 84.5
2 89.2 83.4 74.8 97.2 88.6 89.2
3 93.3 87.1 33.7 81.9 93.3 44.6
4 74.7 92.6 91.5 85.8 87.1 84.0
5 87.0 87.3 95.1 76.7 89.1 92.8
6 90.6 91.9 90.0 88.8 80.2 86.2
All 84.3 89.8 83.4 85.5 88.1 82.3
Regions
All 83.0 90.1 90.4 86.0 87.4 87.7
Regions
Except 3
4.1.2.2 Analysis Method
Both the Ashtech DGPS and the multilateration position reports are time stamped with GPS
time. The multilateration position report time stamps are generated at the ATIDS Master Work
Station (MWS) after the reports are received at the RTs and sent to the MWS. The
multilateration report time stamps are corrected to compensate for an estimated 200
microseconds of communications delay between the RTs and the MWS.
Linear interpolation is used to determine the Ashtech DGPS position at the times corresponding
multilateration report position updates. The Ashtech GPS position is corrected to account for the
displacement between the GPS and Mode S antennas on the B-757s fuselage. Cross track, along
track, and total horizontal error were analyzed. The accuracy assessment was performed using
raw multilateration position reports (i.e., data was not track processed).
4.1.2.3 Results
Multilateration accuracy performance results, shown in Table 5, were compiled for several
straight segments of the movement area. Taxiway C experienced accuracy performance that was
significantly better than the R26L and Taxiway E runs. Horizontal Dilution of Precision (H_DOP)
was a major factor in the differences in performance for the three segments. When the ATIDS
system receives a Mode S squitter by more than three RTs, the system selects the triad solutions
that have the best HDOP value. Accuracy performance for Taxiway C was very good, because
the position solutions were the result of triads that had HDOP values consistently close to 1. A
wider range of HDOP values were experienced for R26L and Taxiway E, accordingly accuracy
was degraded as compared to the Taxiway C segment.
Figures B-10, B-12, B-14, B-16 and B-18 provide plots of multilateration position with respect to
centerline and Ashtech DGPS position. Figures B-11, B-13, B-15, B-17 and B-19 illustrate cross
track and along track errors that were experienced for each runway/taxiway straight segment.
The R26L segment experienced the largest errors. The accuracy performance on R26L varied
significantly from run to run as can be seen by comparing Figure B-17 and B-19. There were
several cases in the ATIDS input files where receptions were available for better DOP triad
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solutions, yet poorer DOP triads were used for providing position solutions. The system
problems identified in the coverage results section also adversely impact accuracy performance.
Table 5. Multilateration Accuracy Results
Location No. of
samples
R26L 610
Taxiway D 1937
Taxiway E - East 611
Taxiway E - West 1136
Taxiway C 870
4.1.3 Update Rate
Along Track Position Cross Track Position Total Horizontal
Error (meters) Error (meters) Position Error (meters)
Mean Std 95% Mean Std 95% Mean Std 95%
Dev Dev Dev
4.8 6.7 +12.1 1.0 5.2 +10.6 8.5 4.8 +15.8
0.2 3.3 +6.1 -0.8 2.1 +4.4 3.4 2.0 +6.9
-5.2 6.4 +18.9 1.3 7.0 +12.8 8.7 6.6 +21.7
-2.2 3.6 +8.3 -0.6 5.5 +10.9 6.1 3.3 +12.1
-1.6 2.7 +6.4 0.7 2.0 +4.1 3.1 2.1 +7.4
4.1.3.1 Data Collection
The B-757 corrected master file was used in the evaluation of multilateration update rate
performance.
4.1.3.2 Analysis Method
Mode S transponders are specified to transmit DF11 short squitters at a nominal interval of once
a second [5]. Data recorded in ATL has shown that many aircraft squitter at rates faster than the
specified rate. In fact, the B-757s transponder was recorded by ATIDS to generate squitters
nominally every .645 seconds. The objective of the update rate analysis was to determine a
surveillance update rate for an aircraft transmitting squitters to specification. The analysis was
performed using the multilaterated DF 17 transmissions which were transmitted at a rate of twice
per second. The results were normalized for once a second transmission rate to provide an
expected surveillance performance for a transponder squittering at a rate of once per second. The
corrected master file was analyzed to assess update rate performance.
4.1.3.3 Results
Figure 6 provides a histogram of update success rate with a transmission rate normalized to once
a second update rate. The 98% success rate occurs at the 4 second update interval. The success
rate at the one second update interval is 45%. Figure 7 provides a histogram representing the
distribution of updates. While not shown in Figure 7, the nominal update interval occurs at 1.1
seconds. As can be seen from Figure 7, there are peaks near 2, 3 and 4 seconds. These peaks
represent cases where ATIDS failed to update the position for one or more Mode S transmissions
and determined position on subsequent transmissions.
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4.1.4 Comparison to Requirements
Table 6 provides a comparison of multilateration performance to proposed A-SMGCS
requirements. A performance summary for all three surveillance technologies is provided in
Table 16. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the proposed A-SMGCS requirements.
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4.1.5 Conclusions
The prototype ATIDS did not meet coverage, accuracy and update rate requirements. In
examination of ATIDS log data, it appears that there are some processing problems. Missed
position updates occurred even when error free Mode S transmissions were available at RTs that
provide favorable DOP. Additionally, there were cases where unfavorable DOP triads were used
instead of available higher DOP triads. The position processing problems were most prevalent
for the B757 which transmitted both the short squitter DF1 ls and long squitter ADS-B DF17s.
The problem resulted in lost updates and potentially degraded accuracy.
ATIDS accuracy performance would have benefited from track position smoothing. A tracker
was used for position update sanity checks, but was not used for position smoothing. Track
position smoothing is performed for the ASDE-3/AMASS.
The system update rate performance is limited by the specified transponder squitter rate of a
nominal update rate of once a second, uniformly distributed over the range from .8 to 1.2
seconds. Assuming perfect squitter reception, ATIDS could not meet the once a second (98%)
surveillance update rate requirement.
The ATIDS ATL installation provided multilateration coverage out to 1.5 NM. This may not be
enough to provide overlapping coverage with the approach radar at some facilities. ATIDS was
sited to provide good DOP for the movement area. Accuracy performance beyond runway
threshold is degraded due to DOP performance issues. Accuracy performance on approach was
not assessed.
4.2 ADS-B Surveillance Evaluation
4.2.1 Coverage
4.2.1.1 Data Collection
To analyze the ADS-B coverage performance, the master file derived from several NASA 757
runs (described in Section 3.2) and the van log files were used.
4.2.1.2 Analysis Method
The ADS-B master file was plotted on the ATL map to determine if coverage gaps existed. The
master file was also analyzed to determine which RTs received an error-free ADS-B message for
each position update. The error-free reception files were plotted by RT to find coverage gaps for
each receiver. The ADS-B reports received at each RT were also analyzed to determine the
percentage that were received in error and how many bits were in error. Finally, the vehicle to
vehicle files were examined to evaluate the scenarios described in Section 3.2.2.
The performance of an ADS-B system is a function of the location and number of receivers. The
results presented here are dependent upon the configuration of ATIDS, which is primarily a
multilateration system. The receivers were sited to optimize their ability to meet this function.
2O
They are arranged to provide the best possible geometry for determining position. If the
receivers were arranged to provide the best ADS-B coverage, it is likely that the ADS-B
performance would be improved. It is also possible that fewer receivers, cited more effectively
for ADS-B could be used, while maintaining the same performance of ATIDS. Therefore, the
results presented here must be viewed in the context of an ADS-B system that doubles as a
multilateration system.
4.2.1.3 Results
Figure 8 shows the master ADS-B file plotted on the ATL map. A circle is plotted for each
position update where at least one of the five RTs received an error-free transmission. For this
file, several gaps existed where more than two transmissions were missed. Each of these areas
were examined for different runs, and none of the areas were found to be consistently missing
updates. It may be concluded that as a system of five ADS-B receivers, where only one of the
five receivers is required to receive an error-free transmission, ADS-B provides 100% movement
area coverage.
Figure C- 1 shows the error-free reception performance of RT 0, sited on top of the Delta hangar
on the south east border of the coverage area. This RT received 54.8% of the transmissions
error-free. RT 0 had good coverage on the east side of the region and poor coverage on the west
side.
RT 1 was cited on top of the Ford plant on the east side of the coverage area. Figure C-2 shows
the error-free reception for this RT. RT 1 had the best reception performance (69.2%) with
reliable coverage of all areas except the west side of taxiway "E" and runway 26L. This was
most likely due to multipath caused by the Delta hangar.
Figure C-3 shows error-free reception for RT 2, cited on top of the Renaissance Hotel. This RT
had very poor coverage on taxiway "E" and large coverage gaps on runway 26L. Otherwise, this
RT performed well with 59.5% coverage. These coverage gaps were also most likely due to
multipath from the Delta hangar.
RT 3 was located on top of the FAA's Regional Office building. As shown in Figure C-4, this
RT covered taxiway "E" very well, compensating for the poor coverage there by RTs 1, 2, and 4.
RT 3 was not able to cover the General Aviation (GA) ramp area or the north taxiway "A"
however, likely due to blockage from buildings and fuel tanks in the northwest region of the
airport. Overall, RT 3 received 59.9% of all transmissions error-free.
Figure C-5 shows the reception performance of RT 4 located on top of Concourse C. This RT
had good coverage on the west side of the movement area and very poor nonexistent coverage on
the south east side. This was likely due to blockage from the other airport concourses. This large
blocked area resulted in the lowest overall reception performance of 52.6%.
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To further confirm the area specific coverage performance of each RT, the north side movement
area was broken down into six regions and reception statistics were compiled for each region.
See Figure 6 for a diagram of the regions and Table 7 for the reception results. The system
received better than 98% reception in each region except 3 and 4. Region 3 is near the Delta
hangers which is a source for multipath. RT 2 experienced severe multipath in Region 3. RT 4
experience blockage in Region 3 from buildings and hangers.
Table 7. ADS-B Regional Reception Performance By RT
At Least I RT of 5
RT 0 (Delta Hangar)
RT I (Ford Plant)
RT 2 (Renaissance Hotel)
RT 3 (FAA Region)
RT 4 (Concourse C)
Region 1
98.9%
52.4%
88.4%
69.2%
65.7%
80.8%
Region2
98.0%
73.4%
58.3%
42.9%
91.0%
54.6%
Region 3
95.0%
65.5%
50.6%
8.6%
70.7%
4.1%
Region 4
95.6%
36.4%
80.2%
68.8%
47.3%
56.4%
Region 5
98.1%
57.5%
58.3%
80.7%
48.7%
58.9%
Region 6
99.6%
64.6%
78.2%
54.4%
62.5%
53.6%
All
Regions
96.5%
54.8%
69.2%
59.5%
59.9%
52.6%
Bit error analysis was conducted to determine if error correction would enhance reception
performance. For each RT (Table 8), the data output files were examined to determine what
percentage of total transmissions had been received with no errors, what percentage had no
message bits in error but with failed parity (error in parity bits), what percentage had 1, 2, or 3+
bits in error. The remainder either had too many errors to be recognized as from the NASA 757
or were not received at all. The RTs generally received around 60% with no error and abo/it 2%
of each 0 bit (failed parity), 1 bit, or 2 bit errors. If error correction were to be applied, it is
thought that only the 0 bit and 1 bit error messages could be recovered, and some of the 2 bit
error messages could be recovered. For the data analyzed, that would improve the reception
percentage of each RT by about 6%.
At Least 1 RT
RT 0 Delta Hangar
Table 8.
Expected
Replies
3348
3348
RT 1 Ford Plant 3348
RT 2 Renaissance Hotel 3348
3348RT 3 FAA Re[ion
RT 4 Concourse C 3348
ADS-B Bit Error Statistics by RT
Error
Free
96.5%
54.8%
69.2%
59.5%
59.9%
52.6%
Failed Parity
0 Bit Errors
1 Bit
Error
2 Bit
Errors
3 or More
Bit Errors
Not
Received
3.0% 2.5% 3.0% 22.2% 14.6%
2.9% 1.9% 1.4% 13.6% 11.1%
2.8% 1.9% 2.1% 16.1% 17.5%
2.7% 2.8% 2.5% 18.5% 13.5%
1.9%2.1% 23.2%2.4% 17.9%
The van was driven on the movement area to investigate 1090 MHz ADS-B coverage
performance for ground vehicles. The van ADS-B coverage results are provided in Table 9. The
reception performance for the van ADS-B transmissions was similar to the results obtained for
the B-757 (Table 7).
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Table 9. Van ADS-B Reception Percentage by Region
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 All Regions
Received error-free 98.3% 98.5% 97.0% 97.2% 97.1% 97.6% 97.5%
b_ at least 1 RT
In addition to the NASA 757 tests, van tests were also conducted. An ADS-B equipped van was
driven through the ramp areas to evaluate the coverage in these areas. The ADS-B transmissions
were recorded at the ATIDS Master Work Station. These output files were analyzed for
reception percentage and coverage gaps. Figure C-6 shows the ADS-B reports received by at
least one RT error-free. Large coverage gaps exist in ramp areas 1 and 3. Ramp 2 was not tested.
Ramp 4 showed better coverage, but still with large gaps in coverage. Ramp 5 showed the best
coverage of 96%. Overall, the ramp areas had 69% coverage (Table 10), well below the 96.5%
coverage of the movement area. Because 1090 MHz ADS-B requires clear line of sight to
consistently receive, none of the five RTs had complete coverage of all the ramp areas.
Analysis of the individual RT performance in the ramp area conf'LrmS the line of sight
requirement for reception. RT 0 had almost no reception of the ramp areas because of it relative
placement. RT 1 fared slightly better, with partial coverage of the north side of the ramps. RTs 2
and 3 performed well, with a good angle and line of sight to most of the ramp areas. RT 4
received only in ramps 3 and 4, the ramp areas adjacent to its placement on concourse C.
Table 10. Van ADS-B Reception Percentage by Ramp Area
Ramp 1 Ramp 3 Ramp 4 Ramp 5 All Areas
Received error-free 50.1% 59.5% 74.1% 95.9% 68.6%
by at least I RT
ADS-B approach coverage performance was assessed, keeping in mind that the system was
optimised for surface surveillance. Figure C-7 provides a plot of approach coverage. RT 3
(Regional Office Building) was the only RT aimed eastward along the approach. RT 3 first
detected the B757 at 17 NM. RT 3 dropped surveillance between 13.3 NM and 7.4 NM. At
approximately 4.8 NM, the other RTs started receiving error free receptions. The gap in
surveillance was experienced in other runs for eastbound and westbound approaches. The results
show that there was adequate coverage to provide seamless operations with the approach radar.
4.2.2 Accuracy
4.2.2.1 Data Collection
ADS-B data collected during B757 taxi-only runs was analyzed to access accuracy performance.
The truth source was provided by Ashtech GPS data that was logged in the B-757 and at the
DGPS base station.
4.2.2.2 Analysis Method
Both the Ashtech DGPS and the ADS-B position reports are time stamped with GPS time.
While the both Ashtech and the ADS-B GPS receivers have a one hertz output, the outputs have
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different times of applicability. The time of applicability for each Ashtech update is known to
occur at each GPS epoch. Unlike the Ashtech, the ADS-B GPS receiver position outputs do not
occur at each GPS epoch. The exact time of applicability of the ADS-B position reports is
therefore unknown. The ADS-B position reports are time stamped at the Master Work Station
after incurring time delays associated with ADS-B avionics communications and the RT to MWS
communications.
Straight segments of a B-757 taxiing were analyzed for accuracy performance. Cross track,
along track, and total horizontal error were analyzed. The communications delays primarily
show up as an along track bias error. The Ashtech position data was processed to minimize the
along track mean error thus removing this bias. Linear interpolation was used to determine the
Ashtech DGPS position that corresponded in time to the ADS-B position updates. One
limitation of this approach is that it artificially minimizes the along track mean and along track
95% numbers. However, cross track accuracy performance (e.g., mean, standard deviation, 95%)
numbers and along track standard deviation are not affected by the analysis method.
4.2.2.3 Results
ADS-B position reports use the Compact Position Reporting (CPR) format as a means of
encoding latitude and longitude values in a 34-bit message. This formatting scheme divides the
globe into approximately square discrete grid coordinates. The true position is then mapped to
the closest grid position. To achieve globally unambiguous decoding, there are actually two
different grid spacings defined, which produce grids that match up at some locations and do not
match at others. Because this method is discrete, the positions reported tend to jump as can be
seen by Figures C-13 and C-15. The large jumps are attributed to the actual position
transitioning from one grid location to the next, therefore the CPR algorithm reports the position
to be on one grid line at one instance and then on the new grid line the next second. The smaller
jumps are attributed to the odd/even second grid differences given they exist at that location.
Table 11 provides the results of the accuracy assessment. Longitudinal mean is zero because of
the analysis method. The true longitudinal accuracy can be expected to be close to the. 1 meter
lateral mean, based on the assumption that DGPS errors are approximately equal in all directions
horizontally.
Runway/Taxiway
Table 11. ADS-B Accuracy Results
Along Track Position Cross Track Position Error Total Horizontal Position
Error (meters) (meters) Error (meters)
MeanlStd. Dev. 195% Mean Std. Dev. 95% Mean Std. Dev. I 95%0.0 0.5 _+0.9 -0.1 0.6 _+1.4 0.7 0.4 +_.1.42
4.2.3 Update Rate
4.2.3.1 Data Collection
To analyze the ADS-B update rate, the NASA 757 master data file was used.
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4.2.3.2 Analysis Method
For purposes of this analysis, the definition of a position update was established to be any error-
free ADS-B report rather than a new or unique position update. This is an important distinction
because the DGPS position was updated in the aircraft once per second, but position information
was transmitted pseudo-randomly at a nominal rate of twice per second. This typically resulted
in the same position being transmitted twice (and sometimes three times) consecutively. This
definition was chosen because it better reflects the ability of the system to receive ADS-B
information independent of the aircraft equipage. The performance of the system is not
penalized for the position calculation rate of an individual aircraft. Also, it is expected that the
calculation rate will be increased in an operational system, so using this method better reflects
the performance potential of this system.
It is known that the Collins ADS-B unit transmits the Mode S extended squitter pseudo-randomly
at a nominal rate of once every 0.5 seconds. If perfect reception were achieved by the system, the
ATIDS output files would include an ADS-B position update approximately twice every second.
The data showed occasional missed updates when none of the RTs received an error-free
transmission. To quantify the amount of missed updates, the time difference between valid
ADS-B updates was calculated for each update and statistics were compiled on this data.
4.2.3.3 Results
It was determined in the coverage analysis that updates were missed 3.5% of the time. Analysis
of the time interval data reveals information about how often multiple consecutive updates were
missed and the update rate performance. Figure 9 shows the distribution of time intervals. It is
clear from the figure that the nominal update rate was 0.5 seconds with a jitter of 0.1 seconds.
Most of the updates occurred 0.5 + 0.1 seconds after the previous one. Occasionally an update
was missed so the next distribution of update intervals is centered around 1 second. Figure 10
shows the cumulative update interval curve with a 98% line. The probability of receiving an
update within the nominal update interval plus the jitter (0.6 seconds) was 96.3%. There was a
98% probability of receiving an update within 0.95 seconds, thus exceeding the one-second
requirement.
4.2.4 Vehicle to Vehicle ADS-B Coverage
4.2.4.1 Data Collection
The B757 ADS-B transmissions were received and logged by the test van 1090 MHz ADS-B
receiver. During taxiing operations, ADS-B transmissions originated from the B757 top
mounted antenna. Both the top and bottom mount antennas were used when the wheels were up
(e.g., squat switch deactivated). Depending on the scenario, as described in the 4.2.4.3, the test
van was either stationary or moving behind the taxiing B757.
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Figure 10. ADS-B Update Success Rate
4.2.4.2 Analysis Method
ADS-B update position plots were used as the primary means for assessing vehicle to vehicle
surveillance performance. The plots provided a good picture of the performance limitations of
1090 MHz ADS-B for the vehicle to vehicle application, although quantitative assessments were
limited.
27
4.2.4.3 Results
Scenario 1 - Arrival monitoring. Figure C-8 provides a plot of the B757 ADS-B reports
received by the ADS-B receiver in the test van. With several runs made, Figure C-8 provides a
good representative plot of coverage. The test van antenna was positioned at a height of 3
meters. Line of sight was maintained throughout the approach. Reception was lost during
aircraft banking when turning on to the 8L approach. During the straight segment of the
approach, there were 6 time periods when gaps in updates exceeded 4.8 seconds (e.g., update rate
of an airport surveillance radar). The largest time gap was 10.8 seconds. These gaps were
experienced mostly when the B757 was on the last five miles of the approach.
Scenario 2 - Runway occupancy monitoring. Figure C-9 provides a plot of the B757 ADS-B
reports received by the ADS-B receiver in the test van. The test van was parked on the north east
corner of the airport. The antenna was set to a 3 meter height. Line of sight was maintained
throughout the approach and during taxiing. As shown in Figure C-9, there were significant
drops in ADS-B updates during B757 taxiing. Several antenna heights and parking locations
were tried. All site/antenna height configurations experienced significant loss of updates.
Scenario 3 - Aircraft in-trail spacing monitoring. Figure C-10 provides an illustration of the
B757 top mount antenna ADS-B transmissions recorded by the test van as it followed the
aircraft. The van ADS-B antenna height was set to 3 meters, which is equivalent to the antenna
height of a small aircraft. The van maintained a spacing of approximately 200 meters behind the
B757 up to the stop point identified in the figure. At the start point of this run, the van was
driven parallel to the taxiway centerline, but 10 meters offset from the centerline. Consistent
receptions were maintained through the first turn. After the first turn, the van was repositioned to
a centerline path. When the van lined up behind the B757 and both were traveling in a straight
line, reception was lost. As soon as the B757 initiated a turn towards runway 8L, receptions were
reestablished. The B757 crossed runway 8L and stopped at the 8R hold line. The van was driven
off into the grass area to the side of the aircraft. Reception was maintained while the van was
next to the B757. During the departure on 8R, ADS-B reception was lost for two segments of
time.
Additional testing was performed with the B757 stationary and the van positioned behind the
aircraft. Testing confirmed that there is a blind spot behind the B757 where ADS-B
transmissions are not received. Even with the antenna mast set to 15 meters (e.g., approximate
height of a B747 top mounted antenna), ADS-B transmissions were not received.
4.2.5 Comparison to Requirements
Table 12 provides the performance of ADS-B compared to the proposed A-SMGCS
requirements.
4.2.6 Conclusions
Compliance with the A-SMGCS coverage, accuracy, and update rate requirements were
demonstrated for the ADS-B surface surveillance. 1090 MHz ADS-B is susceptible to multipath
and blockage from buildings and hangars. Five RTs provided sufficient diversity to ensure high
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confidenceADS-B positionreportreception.ATIDS wasconfiguredfor multilaterationwith
RTs placedaroundtheperimeterof thecoveragearea.This placementmaynotrequiredfor
ADS-B. Thereis potentialto meetA-SMGCSrequirementswith lessreceivers.Fromthe
updaterateanalysis,it maybeconcludedthatsquitterratesmustbe0.5secondsor fasterto meet
the98% in 1.0 second requirement. The ADS-B accuracy with LAAS far exceeded the A-
SMGCS accuracy requirements.
1090 MHz ADS-B met the A-SMGCS approach surveillance requirements. Coverage was
limited to approximately 7 NM. ATIDS was optimized for surface surveillance. Approach
coverage performance could be improved even more via optimization of antenna alignment and
wing settings, and reduction of RT cable losses.
Vehicle-to-vehicle 1090 MHz ADS-B did not demonstrate sufficient performance to support TIS.
The vehicle-to-vehicle coverage test results were consistent with the ADS-B ground system
results in that each ADS-B receiver did not provide full coverage in areas where line-of-sight was
maintained. The vehicle ADS-B receiver experienced coverage gaps when monitoring ADS-B
aircraft arrivals. Conversely, based on data link symmetry, an ADS-B receiver equipped arrival
can be expected to experience the same loss of surveillance on taxiing aircraft on the runway.
Degraded coverage performance can be overcome by through receiver diversity with the ground
system implementation. However, diversity is not an option for vehicle based surveillance. One
alternative that was demonstrated successfully in ATL was a separate VHF based TIS data link.
The VHF data link maintained consistent coverage performance for surface operations.
Implementation of 1090 MHz ADS-B traffic information services may require transmission
source augmentation (e.g., low power 1090 MHz repeaters located at the ADS-B ground receive
sites to reinforce the ADS-B transmissions).
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4.3 ASDE-3/AMASS Surveillance Evaluation
4.3.1 Coverage
4.3.1.1 Data Collection
The coverage assessment was performed using the ASDE-3/AMASS master data file. The data
collection was limited to VFR periods with no rain.
4.3.1.2 Analysis Method
An assessment of coverage was performed with the master file. Potential coverage gaps
identified in the ASDE-3/AMASS master file were further investigate to verify repeatability of
gaps with other runs. Approach coverage was evaluated. Coverage performance was also
analyzed for commercial traffic to ensure that the coverage is maintain for a wide variety of
aircraft/vehicle types and sizes. The commercial traffic data was analyzed to identify potential
coverage gaps and false tracks. False tracks are those that meet one of the following criteria:
• A track that does not have another established track leading up to or away from it, meaning
that it is not a continuation of a dropped track.
• A track that pops up for a short period in an area where ASDE-3/AMASS coverage
performance is consistently good.
Other observations were used to that help confirm the existence of false tracks such as:
• Identifying pop up tracks in the middle of the runway when it is 'hot' due to an arrival or
departure.
• Identifying pop up tracks at locations where there are no intersections. Aircraft and ground
vehicles rarely cross runways at any location other than intersections. Additionally, the target
extent information was used to identify tracks that are too large to be ground vehicles.
4.3.1.3 Results
Figure 11 provides a plot of the ASDE-3/AMASS master file. Approach coverage is limited to
inside the runway thresholds. Consistent coverage with firm track updates was maintained for
the movement area with the exception of a 125 meter section of Taxiway E in front of the Delta
hangar. Line of sight from the tower to this area is blocked by the hanger. Other B757 runs were
examined. The coverage of the B757 consistently was lost in the same area in front of the
hangar. On examination of data files with commercial traffic, heavy aircraft (e.g., L1011)
maintained track in this region, but other aircraft did not.
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Figure D- 1 provides a plot of commercial traffic over a period of 20 minutes with 32 operations.
The AMASS data was analyzed to identify false tracks. Some examples of false tracks are
identified in Figure D-l, based on the analysis criteria identified in paragraph 4.3.1.2. The false
tracks identified on taxiway E in front of the Delta hangars are the one exception to the criteria
established in 4.3.1.2. These false tracks pop up in an area of poor coverage. However, the
probability is very low that an aircraft could taxi to the location where there are false tracks
without detection. In most cases, the false tracks show up as tracks moving in directions other
than in the direction of normal traffic flow. There were cases where false tracks popped up in the
middle of a runway when it was 'hot' due to an arrival or departure. Several of the false tracks
popped up at locations where there are no intersections. At ATL, ground vehicles rarely cross
runways at any location other than intersections. Ground vehicle operations, except in
emergencies, are very limited during high traffic periods. There is an unusually high level of
activity with more than 10 pop up tracks on the runway over a 20-minute departure push.
Additionally, the target extent information indicated that these tracks were often too large to be
ground vehicles.
Figures D-2 and D-3 provide two commercial traffic scenarios where coverage was lost for
vehicles crossing runway 8L. In the first scenario, Figure D-2, a vehicle of unknown type taxied
up to the hold line on a runway 8L high speed ramp. The system dropped track when the vehicle
was stopped and failed to reestablish track until after the vehicle had proceeded 76 meters past
the hold line. In the second scenario, Figure D-3, ASDE-3/AMASS experienced two periods
where the track was coasted while an aircraft was crossing runway 8L. In the first coast period,
the ASDE-3/AMASS gives a false indication that the aircraft is turning to taxi down the runway.
In the second period, the track was coasted into the grass area and outside of the runway safety
zone. It is not known why surveillance updates were lost in both of these scenarios.
Examination of other ASDE-3/AMASS files showed that surveillance was maintained for other
traffic.
4.3.2 Accuracy
4.3.2.1 Data Collection
The accuracy assessment was performed using the ASDE-3/AMASS master data file and the
corresponding Ashtech DGPS data logged in the B-757.
4.3.2.2 Analysis Method
An analysis of ASDE-3/AMASS accuracy with respect to target centroid was performed. The
analysis was f'trst performed by correlating the Ashtech position reports in time with the ASDE-
3/AMASS position reports. Linear interpolation is used to determine the Ashtech position at
each ASDE-3/AMASS update time. Straight segments of a B-757 taxi only run were analyzed
for accuracy performance. Cross track, along track, and total horizontal error were analyzed with
respect to the B-757s centroid, nose, and tail. The accuracy assessment was performed using
track processed ASDE-3/AMASS position reports. AMASS track speed and heading accuracy
performance were evaluated using the speed and heading derived from the Ashtech position
reports as truth.
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An analysis was performed to determine if ASDE-3/AMASS extent information could be used to
meet the reference point accuracy requirement. Reference point information is required to detect
hold line violations into the runway safety zone. Target extent provides information about the
length and width with respect to the target centroid of an aircraft under surveillance. Extent
information of the B-757 was compared to the aircraft's actual length and width.
4.3.2.3 Results
The accuracy results for ASDE-3/AMASS are provided in Table 13. Figures D-4, D-6, D-8, D-
10 and D-12 provide plots of along-track and cross-track position error for five straight
runway/taxiway segments. The ASDE-3/AMASS maintained consistent along track and cross
track position accuracy performance across the three runway/taxiway segments. Figures D-5, D-
7, D-9, D- 11 and D-13 provide a plot of ASDE-3/AMASS track position and corresponding
Ashtech position for the same segments.
Runway/Taxiway
Table 13. ASDE-3/AMASS Accuracy Results
Along Track Position Error Cross Track Position Error Total Horizontal Position
(meters) (meters) Error (meters)
mean Std. Dev. I 95% mean[Std. Dev. I 95% meanlStd. Dev. I 95%
-.43 3.2 +/-5.5 .22 2.4 +/-4.5 3.50 2.0 +/-6.4
Table 14 provides the results of the speed and heading accuracy assessment. The largest errors in
speed occur at low speeds. Figure 12 provides a plot showing the B-757 stopped for 40 seconds
before accelerating. During the stopped periods ASDE-3/AMASS reported speeds up to 6 knots.
It took more than 10 seconds after initiating acceleration for the velocity to go above the 6 knot
value, thus giving a delayed indication of aircraft acceleration.
Table 14. ASDE-3/AMASS Speed and Heading Accuracy Results
Speed
Heading 4.7 deg
Mean Error Standard Deviation
19 knots 1.6 knots
4.3 de[_
ASDE-3/AMASS target extent information was analyzed for the hold line violation detection
application. Figure 13 provides a comparison of ASDE-3/AMASS extent and true B-757
measurements. Aircraft nose location, derived from length information, is critical for detecting a
hold line violation. Uncertainty in locating the nose of the aircraft adds time delay to alerting.
The ASDE-3/AMASS length measurement varied by approximately +/- 10 meters from the true
length. The combination of centroid position error with extent error does not support a +/- 3
meter reference point accuracy.
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Figure 13. ASDE-3/AMASS Extent Plot
4.3.3 Update Rate
4.3.3.1 Data Collection
The B757 master file of ASDE-3/AMASS surveillance data was used in the evaluation of update
rate.
4.3.3.2 Analysis Method
Update success rate and distribution of updates were analyzed using firm track updates. Coasted
updates were not included in the assessment.
4.3.3.3 Results
Figure 14 provides a histogram of the update success rate for the ASDE-3/AMASS. The 98%
success rate occurs at 1.05 seconds. Figure 15 provides a histogram presenting the distribution of
36
updates. The radar maintained consistent once a second updates in all regions except the one
region in front of the Delta hangars where updates were lost.
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Figure 14. ASDE-3/AMASS Update Rate Success
1600
1400
1200
= 1000
800
_ 6oo
400
20O
0
h
II
'!
/
o o o o o o o o o o-- .-:.:.;- ; _ _ --- _
Update Interval (Sec)
Figure 15. ASDE-3/AMASS Update Distribution
4.3.4 Comparison to Requirements
Table 15 provides the performance of ASDE-3/AMASS compared with proposed A-SMGCS
requirements.
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4.3.5 Conclusions
ASDE-3/AMASS met the A-SMGCS accuracy and update rate requirements, but did not meet
the coverage requirements. Coverage gaps were experienced on the taxiways. Approach
coverage is limited to the runway thresholds, which will not ensure overlapping coverage with
the approach radar. While the ASDE-3/AMASS demonstrated a high probability of position
update success, it did experience a missed detection for runway safety zone entry detection. It is
not known if the incident was vehicle type/size dependent.
ASDE-3/AMASS was observed in ATL to incur a significant level of false tracks in critical areas
such as runways and high speed exits. False tracks tend to appear in predictable locations. These
present problems for AMASS safety logic, resulting in false alerts for AMASS. During low
visibility operations, flight crews with traffic displays would have difficulty distinguishing
between real traffic and false targets.
ASDE-3/AMASS provides the aircraft centroid position. The system extent data does not
provide accurate nose and tall location information. This can result in a large degree of
uncertainty in determining if and when an aircraft has crossed the hold line on entry to the
runway or on exiting the runway. This uncertainty may result in delaying time to alarm for
runway incursions.
It should be mentioned that although the ASDE-3 at Atlanta is an operational system, the
AMASS used for the tests is a prototype. It is expected that some of the performance observed,
such as track processing, will be improved when AMASS becomes operational.
5.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary of Comparison to Requirements
Table 16 provides a summary comparing multilateration, 1090 MHz ADS-B, and ASDE-
3/AMASS surveillance performance with the proposed A-SMGCS requirements.
4O
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5.2 Multilateration Surveillance Recommendations
. Approach coverage/DOP should be addressed as part of the multilateration site surveys
for DFW. The system needs to ensure overlapping coverage with the approach radar at
the accuracy level equivalent to or better than the radar.
. Multipath mitigation techniques should be investigated and tested. Improvements in this
area may help to reduce the number of receiver transmitter sites required for
multilateration. Additionally, reducing the impact of multipath on the transmissions will
benefit accuracy performance.
. A multipath model should be developed and integrated with the multilateration accuracy
model. This new model should be used to evaluate DF'W sites. Careful site selection can
help to minimize the impact of multipath.
4. Analysis/simulations should be performed using ATL data to assess compliance with the
following A-SMGCS requirements:
Incursion Detection
Route Deviation
. Mode S multilateration performance should be re-evaluated at DFW to determine if the
installed system(s) will achieve A-SMGCS accuracy, update rate and accuracy
requirements. ATIDS as implemented at ATL did not demonstrate compliance with these
requirements.
, Mode A/C multilateration should be evaluated at DFW. The test results should be
evaluated to determine the number of sites requiring receive only ground stations, as
opposed to receive/transmit ground stations.
7. Perform a multilateration test at DF'W to ensure compliance with the A-SMGCS
requirements that were not evaluated in ATL, including:
A.1.2
A.2.1
A.2.2
A.2.7
A.2.11
Operating Conditions
Surveillance Coverage (Ramp Area)
Traffic Loading
Surveillance Velocity Accuracy
Reference Point Accuracy
. The Ashtech DGPS data files and multilateration input data files collected in ATL should
be used to test the processing performance of the DFW multilateration system(s) prior to
installation. This approach could be used to provide early resolution of the types of
problems that were experienced in ATL including:
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a) Trackerrelateddropoutexperiencedduringperiodsof accelerationand
deceleration.
b) Lossof positionupdatesexperiencedwhenbothModeS shortsquittersandADS-
B long squittersaretransmittedfrom thesameaircraft.
c) Degradedaccuracyperformancethatoccurswhenthesystemfails to useavailable
RTsthat providegoodDOPpositionsolutions.
5.3 ADS-B Surveillance Recommendations
.
.
°
°
.
6.
The ADS-B/multilateration ground stations should be configured at DFW to provide
maximum approach coverage. This should include using low loss cables and properly
configured directional antennas.
An evaluation should be performed to determine if the number of ground stations can be
reduced for ADS-B only (e.g., no multilateration capability) system installations.
Analysis/simulations using ATL data should be performed to determine compliance with
the following A-SMGCS requirements:
Incursion Detection
Route Deviation
A test and evaluation of 1090 MHz ADS-B should be performed at DFW to verify
compliance with the following A-SMGCS requirements:
A.1.2
A.2.1
A.2.2
A.2.7
A.2.10
A.2.11
Operating Conditions
Surveillance Coverage (Ramp Area)
Traffic Loading
Surveillance Velocity Accuracy
Latency
Reference Point Accuracy
Note: Prototype 1090 MHz ADS-B avionics used in testing should be compliant with the
RTCA 1090 MHz Minimum Operational Performance Standards. The changes to the
ADS-B avionics used in ATL will be significant. Some of the major changes are:
increased GPS receiver position and velocity output rate to the ADS-B transmitter;
variable ADS-B transmission rate; and transmission of GPS antenna location.
ADS-B accuracy performance should be evaluated with WAAS as the position sensor.
Enhanced runway incursion safety logic should be developed and tested. This logic can
take advantage of the highly accurate position, velocity, and heading information that
ADS-B provides. The potential benefits are enhanced time to alert and false alert
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11.
performance of safety logic. Additionally, ADS-B data can be used to determine the
aircraft nose and tail location, thus providing a means to detect runway safety zone
violations.
Avionics based safety logic using ADS-B surveillance should be developed and tested for
surface operations.
Vehicle-to-vehicle ADS-B should be re-tested with the NASA aircraft transmitting ADS-
B data alternatively out of the top and bottom antennas for surface operations. The tested
implementation was to squitter out the top and bottom antennas for airborne and top only
for surface operations. Going to an alternating squitter implementation may help ADS-B
reception performance for an aircraft following another aircraft.
Vehicle-to-vehicle ADS-B surveillance should be evaluated with two aircraft. The ATL
testing was performed with an aircraft and a ground vehicle.
Methods such as 1090 MHz ADS-B reinforcement should be investigated to resolve
vehicle to vehicle surveillance reception performance problems.
Ground vehicle ADS-B data link (assuming not 1090 MHz) tests should be performed.
The performance should be evaluated against the A-SMGCS requirements.
5.4 ASDE-3 Surveillance Recommendations
1. The problem of false targets needs to be resolved.
.
.
Analysis/simulations using ATL data should be performed to determine compliance with
the following A-SMGCS requirements:
Incursion Detection
Route Deviation
Test and evaluation of ASDE-3 surveillance should be performed at DFW to verify
compliance with the following A-SMGCS requirements:
A.1.2
A.2.2
A.2.4
Operating Conditions
Surveillance Altitude Coverage
Traffic Loading
4. Test and evaluation of ground vehicle surveillance performance should be performed.
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APPENDIX A
SURFACE SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

Introduction
This section describes the performance requirements for airport surface surveillance. The
requirements shown here are a compendium of those that have been developed by ICAO and
RTCA [1, 2] for Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS). The
requirements are categorized here according to operational and performance requirements.
Operational requirements are qualitative in nature, and describe the basic functional capability of
the system. Performance requirements are primarily those that have a quantified performance
specified.
A.1 Operational Requirements
A.1.1 Identification
The surveillance function should provide identification and labelling on authorized movements.
A.1.2 Operating Conditions
The surveillance function should be immune to operationally significant adverse effects of weather
and topographical conditions.
A.1.3 Incursion Detection
The surveillance function should enable the detection of any incursions into the areas used for
aircraft movement.
A.1.4 Unauthorized Targets
The surveillance function should continuously indicate the position of unauthorized aircraft,
vehicles and objects, while they are in restricted areas.
A.1.5 Route Deviations
The surveillance function should provide adequate information to enable detection of deviations
from the assigned route.
A.2 Performance Requirements
A.2.1 Surveillance Coverage area
Area of the aerodrome in which surveillance is provided.
Minimum: Airpoi't movement area
A.2.2 Surveillance Altitude coverage
Altitude over the coverage area up to which the surveillance is required to be provided.
Minimum: Up to approximately 500ft.
A-_
A.2.3 Surveillance Approach coverage
Distance from each runway direction at which inbound aircraft will be under surveillance.
Minimum: From at least 10 NM.
Note - This may be provided by approach surveillance radar. The primary requirement is to provide
seamless coverage from the approach phase to the airport surface.
A.2.4 Traffic loading
Number of aircraft/vehicles to be covered by the surveillance function, defined as the maximum
number of:
a) Aircraft on movement area:
b) Aircraft on apron area (where required):
c) Ground vehicles on movement area:
100
100
TBD
d) Ground vehicles on apron area (where required): TBD
A.2.5 Covered speed
Aircraft/vehicle speeds which the surveillance function must accommodate.
a) Up to 250 kts for aircraft on final approach, missed approach and runways
b) Up to 80 kts on runway exits
c) Up to 50 kts on straight taxiways and 20 kts in curves.
A.2.6 Surveillance position accuracy
The difference between a target's measured position and its true position. It is specified in terms of
the 95% horizontal and vertical accuracy performance.
a) Longitudinal position accuracy
Minimum: 10 m
b) Lateral position accuracy
I) Runways and taxiways
Minimum: 10 m
2) Stand (apron) region
Minimum: 3 m
A-2
c) Verticalpositionaccuracy
Minimum: 20 m
A.2.7 Surveillance velocity accuracy
The difference between a target's measured velocity (speed and heading) and its true velocity. It is
specified in terms of the 95 per cent lateral and vertical speed and heading performance.
Speed: I knot
Direction of movement: TBD
A.2.8 Update rate
Maximum time interval at which surveillance reports must be updated.
1 second
A.2.9 Update success rate
The minimum probability of receiving a surveillance report on each target.
98%
A.2.10 Latency
The maximum time between when the target position is determined and its transmission to or use
by the control function.
1 second maximum
A.2.11 Reference point accuracy
Longitudinal accuracy of the location on the aircraft or vehicle to which the system will be referring
in a surveillance position report.
Maximum 3 m
A.2.12 Surveillance integrity
Surveillance integrity relates to the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the
surveillance information. Integrity includes the ability of the surveillance function to provide
timely and valid warnings to the user when the system must not be used for the intended
operation.
Surveillance integrity risk is the probability of an undetected failure which results in incorrect
surveillance information potentially leading to a loss of separation or other hazardous condition.
Note - This leads to derived requirements for minimization of false targets.
A-3
Table A-1. Surveillance Integrity
Integrity Risk (per hour)
Time to Alert (seconds)
A.2.13 Surveillance continuity
Visibility Condition
1 2,3 4
2.0x10 .3 2.0x10 "_ 2.0x10 .6
10 10 2
Surveillance continuity is the capability of the surveillance function (comprising all elements
necessary to process and transmit surveillance information) to perform the surveillance function
without non-scheduled interruption during the intended surface operation.
Surveillance continuity risk is the probability that the system will be interrupted and not provide
surveillance information over the period of the intended operation.
Table 5-14. Surveillance Continuity Risk (Per Hour)
Continuity
Visibilit_ Condition
1 2,3 4
2 x 10 .2 2 x 10 .3 2 x 10 .3
A.2.14 Surveillance availability
Surveillance availability is an indication of the ability of the surveillance function to provide
usable service within the specified coverage area, and is defined as the portion of time during
which the information is used by air traffic control and/or the aircraft flight crew.
Surveillance availability is specified in terms of the probability of the surveillance function being
available at the beginning of the intended operation.
0.999 (all visibility conditions)
REFERENCES
Draft Manual of Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS), 16th
Meeting of the ICAO All Weather Operations Panel, Montreal, June 1997.
The Role of GNSS in Supporting Airport Surface Operations, Draft Report, RTCA SC-159,
Working Group 4B, August 1998.
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APPENDIX B
MULTILATERATION DATA
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B-9
Multilateration Position Reports (Run 24, Echo East side W-E)
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Figure B-10. Multilateration Position Reports (Run 24, Taxiway Echo East side)
40
3O
2O
Multilateration Position Error (Run 24, Echo East side W-E)
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Figure B-11. Multilateration Position Errors (Run 24, Taxiway Echo East side)
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Figure B-17. Multilateration Position Errors (Run 15, Runway 26L)
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APPENDIX E
ACRONYMS

A-SMGCS - Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems
ATIDS - Airport Surface Target Identification System
ATC - Air Traffic Control
AMASS - Airport Movement Area Safety System
ARTS - Automated Radar Terminal System
ASDE-3 - Airport Surface Detection Equipment
AWOP - All Weather Operations Panel
CAPTS - Cooperative Area Precision Tracking System
CDTI - Cockpit Display of Traffic Information
CG - Center-of-Gravity
DGPS - Differential Global Positioning System
FAR - Federal Aviation Regulation
GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems
GPS - Global Positioning System
HDD - Head-Down Display
HUD - Head-Up Display
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
ILS - Instrument Landing System
JAR - Joint Aviation Requirement
LCD - Liquid-Crystal Display (LCD)
LVLASO - Low Visibility Landing And Surface Operations
MASPS - Minimum Aviation Systems Performance Standard
NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
RNP - Required Navigation Performance
ROTO - Roll-Out Turn-Off
RSLS - Runway Status Light System
RSS - Root Sum Square
RVR - Runway Visual Range
SSR - Secondary Surveillance Radar
TCAS - Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
T-NASA - Taxi Navigation and Situational Awareness
TSE - Total System Error
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